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ABSTRACT: At some point in the Incessu Animalium, Aristotle appeals to some geometrical 
claims in order to explain why animal progression necessarily involves the bending (of the 
limbs), and this appeal to geometrical claims might be taking as violating the recommendation 
to avoid “kind-crossing” (as found in the Posterior Analytic). But a very unclear notion of kind-
crossing has been assumed in most debates. I will argue that kind-crossing in the Posterior 
Analytics does not mean any employment of premises from a discipline other than that to which 
the explanandum belongs. Kind-crossing was meant to cover a specific sort of employment of 
premises from a different discipline, namely, the case in which premises from a discipline X are 
taken as the most important explanatory factor that delivers the fullest appropriate explanation 
of an explanandum within discipline Y. If this is so, the employment of geometrical premises in 
the Incessu Animalium is not an instance of the prohibited kind-crossing, but something that is 
in line with the theory of the Posterior Analytics. 
KEY-WORDS: Aristotle; explanation; causality; kind-crossing; locomotion; essencialism. 
RESUMO: Em certa passagem do Incessu Animalium, Aristóteles recorre a algumas afirmações 
geométricas para explicar por que a progressão animal necessariamente envolve a flexão (dos 
membros), e esse apelo a afirmações geométricas pode ser considerado uma violação da 
recomendação de evitar “kind-crossing” (tal como exposto nos Segundos Analíticos). No 
entanto, uma noção pouco clara de “kind-crossing” tem sido assumida no debate. Argumentarei 
que “kind-crossing” nos Segundos Analíticos não significa qualquer emprego de premissas de 
uma disciplina diferente daquela à qual o explanandum pertence. “Kind-crossing” se refere a um 
tipo específico de emprego de premissas provenientes de uma disciplina diferente, a saber, o 
caso em que premissas de uma disciplina X são tomadas como o fator explicativo mais 
importante que fornece a explicação mais apropriada de um explanandum na disciplina Y. Se 
isso é assim, o emprego de premissas geométricas no Incessu Animalium não é um exemplo da 
“transposição” proibida, mas algo que está de acordo com a teoria da Segundos Analíticos.  
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Aristóteles; explicação; causalidade; transposição; locomoção; 
essencialismo 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
 At some juncture in the Incessu Animalium, Aristotle appeals to some 
geometrical claims in order to explain why animal progression necessarily involves the 
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bending – either of the limbs (for animals that have limbs) or of the whole body (for 
limbless animals, as the snakes). But appealing to geometrical claims within a branch a 
zoology seems to violate one recommendation found in the Posterior Analytics, namely, 
the recommendation to avoid “kind-crossing”. Most scholars would be inclined to say 
something stronger: since kind-crossing was prohibited by Aristotle, the Incessu 
Animalium seems to depart from the methodology found in the Posterior Analytics. Yet 
it is quite unclear what kind-crossing exactly means. I will argue that kind-crossing in 
the Posterior Analytics does not mean any employment of premises from a discipline 
other than that to which the explanandum belongs. Kind-crossing was meant to cover a 
specific sort of employment of premises from a different discipline, namely, the case in 
which premises from a discipline X are taken as the most important explanatory factor 
that delivers the fullest appropriate explanation of an explanandum within discipline Y. 
Within this picture, what is going on in the Incessu Animalium is not an instance of the 
prohibited kind-crossing. Explanation of animal progression in the Incessu Animalium is 
in agreement with the theory of the Posterior Analytics.  
 
2. The kind-crossing issue (metabasis eis allo genos): 
 
My aim is not to offer a full-fledged discussion of the problem of kind-crossing 
in Aristotle’s theory of science in the Posterior Analytics.1 I will only give a sketchy 
characterisation of what I take to be some decisive issues involving that problem, then I 
will discuss one passage from Aristotle’s Incessu Animalium which I take to confirm the 
view I have sketched. 
As the problem is usually put, Aristotle seems to forbid the “crossing” from one 
scientific domain to another – for instance, the “crossing” from arithmetic to cosmology 
(cf. Metaphysics 986a3-12, de Caelo 300a14-19), or the “crossing” from geometry to 
physics in general (cf. de Caelo 299a25-30ff.). So far so good, but this is too much 
generic. We need a more fine-grained understanding of what kind-crossing consists in. 
                                                
1 For a full-fledged discussion, see Steinkrüger 2018. I am very sympathetic to his views, but disagree in 
many points. I have no room here to engage in a careful debate, but I mention that one of his merits is to 
avoid taking “genos” in Posterior Analytics I.7 as discipline – he takes it as the particular kind involved in 
a particular demonstration (p. 111) and thereby avoids the conflation of kind-crossing with what I label 
Question 2.  
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Such a more fine-grained understanding can arise from answers to the following 
questions: 
Question 1: Did Aristotle claim that the fullest appropriate explanation of a given 
explanandum within a particular domain could never have its most important 
explanatory factor transported from a different scientific domain?  
Question 2: Did Aristotle claim that a given scientific domain could never employ 
premises which properly belongs to a different scientific domain?  
Both questions are still quite general and ask for more specifications – and I will 
offer some further specifications below – but they are sufficiently distinct from each 
other.  
An example of Question 1 will be the following: “Can the fully appropriate 
explanation of why the progression of animals requires the bending of their limbs be 
given in explanatory terms transported from geometry?”. 
An example of Question 2 will be the following: “Is the expert who studies why 
the progression of animals requires the bending of their limbs allowed to employ in her 
explanatory story some propositions transported from geometry?” 
Another example of Question 1 will be the following: “Can the fully appropriate 
explanation of why some bodies are heavier than others be given in explanatory terms 
transported from geometry?”. 
Another example of Question 2 will be the following: “Is the expert who studies 
why some bodies are heavier than others allowed to employ in her explanatory story 
some propositions transported from geometry?” 
Before proceeding to further specifications of these questions, let me stress that 
they are indeed different and that conflation between them can mar the debate about 
kind-crossing. This conflation stems from a major one, namely, a conflation between 
two different issues concerning what is going on in the Posterior Analytics (I will label 
them Issue 1 and Issue 2 in order to make reference easier and avoid confusion with 
Question 1 etc.): 
 
Issue 1: Is Aristotle (in the Posterior Analytics) describing what it is for an expert to 
have the fullest appropriate explanation of a given explanandum? 
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Issue 2: Is Aristotle (in the Posterior Analytics) describing what it is for an expert to 
have full mastery over a domain?  
The tasks involved in Issue 1 and Issue 2 are indeed inter-related, but even so 
they are different. Take 2R’s belonging to triangles as an explanandum. Attaining the 
fullest appropriate explanation of why 2R belongs to triangles requires a series of 
conditions: surely, one must know what a straight line is, one must know that the 
triangle is a rectilinear plane figure enclosed by three sides, one must know that the 
alternate angles of a line crossing two parallel lines are equivalent (Euclid’s proposition 
I.29), one should be able to draw a parallel line to one of the sides of the triangle, one 
must know that angles around a straight line are equal to two right angles (cf. 
Metaphysics 1051a24-25). Now, knowing all that requires a specific level of expertise – 
but it is still possible for a learner to grasp the full appropriate explanation of why 2R 
belongs to triangles without having full mastery over the domain. The learner might 
have no knowledge at all about many other things within the domain of geometry – 
things about other figures such as hexagons, rhombuses etc., other sort of propositions 
involving angles and lines etc. Even so, the teacher might stress that the fullest 
appropriate explanation of why 2R belongs to triangles depends on specific factors of 
such and such a sort, and stress that the learner must look for factors of the same sort 
when attempting to solve a different problem or to attain the fullest appropriate 
explanation of a different explanandum.2  
I need not dwell on the nature of these specific factors that make an explanation 
the fullest appropriate explanation of its explanandum. But some features of them will 
be important to stress the difference between Issue 1 and Issue 2. Thus, I add – and 
highlight – that the fullest appropriate explanation of each explanandum has two 
prominent features in Aristotle’s theory of science, namely: the fullest appropriate 
explanation should grasp the explanatory factor that allows us to tell what the 
explanandum is or, in other terms, the essence of the explanandum (see 90a14-15, 31-
34); and the fullest appropriate explanation should stick to what the explanandum as 
                                                
2 I have taken the learner as an example in which the distinction between Issue 1 and Issue 2 is most 
conspicuous. But the distinction does not depend on any diachronic development of the expertise. For any 
expert, it is a different thing, for her, (i) to have the fullest appropriate explanation of a given 
explanandum and (ii) to have full mastery over the domain. (I stress again that distinction does not imply 
mutual independence). 
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such is instead of sticking to a generic, concomitant factor that the explanandum happen 
to have in common with other explananda (cf. 75b37-76a9). Now, both these features 
point to a sort of relation between explanans and explanandum that can be stated in 
terms of “reciprocation” (mutual entailment, if they are treated as propositions, or 
coextensiveness, if they are treated as terms in a demonstration). In the case of 2R’s 
belonging to triangles, Aristotle has paid attention to it when characterising its 
demonstration in terms of the strict notion of “katholou” as found in I.4-5. In 
extensional terms, the appropriate subject to which 2R is attributed must be coextensive 
with it; in intensional terms, the appropriate explanatory factor explaining why 2R is 
attributed to the triangle must focus on what exactly the triangle is as a triangle (but not 
as a particular isosceles, or equilateral, or scalene which might happen to be employed 
in a particular diagram).3 
I have stressed these features of the fullest appropriate explanation of a given 
explanandum because they might seem strange (and too stringent) when we move to 
Issue 2 and ask what it is for an expert to have full mastery over a domain. Of course, 
Aristotle will never recommend the following points to any expert: “when you are 
selecting the propositions that properly belong to your field, stick to the reciprocating 
ones; when practising the procedures that properly belong to your field, stick to those 
which involve reciprocating”. Having mastery over a domain includes many other 
things which do not require the strict conditions that apply to the fullest appropriate 
explanation of a given explanandum. Having mastery over a scientific domain includes, 
for instance, being able to collect facts in an organised way,4 being able to classify items 
under general headings and to divide classes,5 being able to spot common factors which 
allow the reduction of several problems to a single one6 etc. 
Let me go back to the distinction between Issue 1 and Issue 2. It is clear that 
Aristotle (in the Posterior Analytics) is not exclusively dedicated to one of the tasks 
involved in Issue 1 or Issue 2 with exclusion of the other. Aristotle is concerned with 
                                                
3 About the “katholou” in I.5, see Hasper 2005. 
4 See for instance Prior Analytics 43b1-11. 
5 See 98a13-19, 96b25ff. 
6 See for instance 98a20-29. 
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both of them within the Posterior Analytics as a whole.7 But, when we come to examine 
a specific passage, a pressing methodological question is for us to ascertain which of 
those issues (Issue 1 or Issue 2) is the main focus of Aristotle exactly in that passage.  
Kind-crossing is discussed mainly in three passages in the Posterior Analytics: 
I.7 (the whole chapter), part of I.9 (76a9-15, 22-25) and the end of I.13 (78b34-79a16). 
We can see how important the distinction between Issue 1 and Issue 2 is for a correct 
assessment (and a correct answer) of Question 1 and Question 2. Several views conflate 
Issue 1 and Issue 2 and so give positive answers to both Question 1 and Question 2. 
Thus, according to them: (i) Aristotle has claimed that the fullest appropriate 
explanation of a given explanandum within a particular domain could never have its 
most important explanatory factor transported from a different scientific domain, and 
(ii) Aristotle has also endorsed the stronger claim that a given scientific domain could 
never employ premises which properly belong to a different scientific domain (with the 
few exceptions recognised as ‘subalternate sciences’).8 
However, I believe that Aristotle’s answers to Question 1 and Question 2 are 
different: while (a) he indeed has claimed that the fullest appropriate explanation of a 
given explanandum within a particular domain could never have its most important 
explanatory factor transported from a different scientific domain, (b) he has never 
endorsed the stronger claim that a given scientific domain could never employ premises 
which properly belongs to a different scientific domain. And the reason why I believe 
that this is so is the following: the key passages in which Aristotle is discussing kind-
crossing are part of what is involved in Issue 1, but not of what is involved in Issue 2. In 
other words, when discussing kind-crossing, Aristotle is describing what it is for an 
expert to have the fullest appropriate explanation of a given explanandum (Issue 1) – 
but he is not concerned with the more general issue of what it is for an expert to have 
full mastery over a domain (Issue 2) and, consequently, he is not addressing the more 
                                                
7 Taking only uncontroversial cases: Issue 1 is tackled (e.g.) in I.5 as a whole, as well as in I.9, whereas 
I.10 can be taken as mostly concerned with Issue 2. I believe most scholars will agree on that. 
Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, the definition of scientific knowledge in 71b9-12 belongs to 
Issue 1, as well as the six requirements for the premises (71b20-32) and the discussion of necessity in I.6 
– but this is highly controversial. 
8 See, for instance, Nussbaum 1978, p. 109-113; McKirahan 1992, p. 50-2; Barnes 1993, p. 131; 
Hankinson 2005, p. 38-40; Mignucci 2007, p. 175. 
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specific question – Question 2 – of whether an expert is allowed or not to employ in her 
explanatory story a premise which properly belongs to a different domain.9 
Thus, the picture which results from what I have defended so far is this: 
The expert studying why (e.g.) the progression of animals requires the bending 
of their limbs is indeed allowed to employ in her explanatory story some terms 
transported from geometry (Question 2 answered by “no”). But that same expert will 
never be able to attain the most appropriate explanation of a given explanandum within 
her domain through an explanatory factor transported from a different scientific domain 
(Question 1 answered by “yes”). Thus, the expert studying the progression of animals 
can employ geometrical premises. But those geometrical premises alone will never 
deliver by themselves the most appropriate explanation of the explanandum at stake. 
The geometrical premises would give some important contribution, and even a 
contribution that could never be eliminated – which is equivalent to saying that, without 
those geometrical premises, the most appropriate explanation will not be attained. 
However, this contribution – in terms of sine quibus non conditions – is different from 
being the most important explanatory factor for explaining the explanandum at stake.  
Now, the kind-crossing issue is itself more complicated and Question 1 deserves 
further specifications, as I have already mentioned. It is helpful to assess the 
complications having the triadic framework of explanations in mind.10 In any domain, 
an explanandum should be parsed as a relation between an attribute and a subject and 
expressed in terms of a predicative sentence, which will occur as the conclusion of a 
demonstration. This parsing and this predicative expression are a reasoned part of 
Aristotle’s philosophy of scientific investigation – and has nothing to do with naïve 
beliefs about the transparency of natural language or about the straightforward 
metaphysical structure of the world. The attribute in the formulation of the 
explanandum must spot what it is exactly that must be explained, and the subject must 
describe its appropriate subject in a way that is relevant to its bearing the attribute to be 
                                                
9 There is no room to offer a full-fledged argument in favour of this point, which depends on a careful 
analysis of what is going on in Posterior Analytics I.2, I.4-10. I have provided an analysis of I.5-6 and I.9 
elsewhere. 
10 I mean: explanations for Aristotle are framed within a triadic structure in which the explanandum is a 
predicative relation, whereas the explanatory factor is a middle term: see 90a5-15, 99a4-5, 16-18. In what 
follows, my employment of the expressions “major terms”, “minor terms” and “middle terms” is only 
meant to capture this triadic structure of explanations without implying anything concerning the 
syllogistic formulation of demonstrations.  
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explained. Thus, when it comes to explain thunder, the attribute to be explained must be 
described in a convenient way: the researcher must present the right description of the 
sort of noise that happens to the clouds; similarly, the researcher must present a relevant 
description of its subject, the clouds.11  
This is important for the classical examples involving the kind-crossing 
discussion. When it comes to explain (e.g.) an explanandum in the domain of optics, the 
explanandum has a complex nature: the subject itself (i.e., the minor term of the 
demonstrative syllogism) belongs to a given domain of things, namely, the natural 
things. Yet optics is concerned with only some attributes of those things – the attributes 
that relate to the way they reflect the light and are seen by us etc. Now, it happens that 
the specific sorts of attributes optics is concerned with can be appropriately explained 
by geometrical propositions. But this is so because the natural lines are considered by 
optics not as natural (or at least not with the whole set of features that make them 
natural) but only qua extended (or something like that). Thus, the genus of that 
explanandum is (so to speak) different from the genus to which its subject itself belong 
(taking genus as equivalent to domain). Natural lines belong to the domain of natural 
items. Yet the selected attributes which optics are concerned with belong rather to a 
different domain – the domain of items that depend on the relations between the primary 
items (points, lines, surfaces) studied in geometry12.  
Thus, it happens that, in the case of optics as well as in the case of other 
subordinated sciences, Aristotle’s answer to Question 1 will be more complex. One sort 
of answer might be tempted to focus on the domain to which the basic items of the 
discipline belong: those basic items (the minor terms of the conclusions), namely, the 
natural lines, are natural items after all. But another answer would focus on the nature 
of the attributes to be explained (the major terms of the conclusions), which are the 
attributes that occur to the natural lines only qua extended lines.13 Aristotle favours the 
                                                
11 This is the gist of PosteriorAnalytics II.2, confirmed in II.8 (93a21ff.) and, more importantly, in II.16 
(98b32-39) and II.17 (99a2-6). For discussion of the latter passages, see Zuppolini 2018. 
12 See Posterior Analytics 77b1-2, 79a3-13; Metaphysics 1078a5-21; Physics 194a7-12 (which asks for a 
more careful discussion – see next note). See Lennox 2008, p. 159-162; Frey (forth.), p. 17. 
13 See previous note for references. The passage in Metaphysics 1078a14-16 is especially important for 
my point, for Aristotle explicitly says that optics is concerned with its subject not qua sight (ᾗ ὄψις) but 
qua lines (ᾗ γραµµαὶ). This claim does not clash with the Physics passage (194a-12). The context of each 
passage is different. In the Physics passage, Aristotle is stressing that optics takes mathematical lines not 
as mathematical but as applied to natural bodies, for otherwise (within the framework presupposed in the 
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latter sort of answer: the genus of the object of optics (namely, the genus of the 
attributes of natural lines qua extended) is after all (and perhaps under some conditions) 
the same as the genus of the extended lines studied by the geometer.14  
Thus, Aristotle’s answer to Question 1 will still be negative: the fullest 
appropriate explanation of a given explanandum within the domain of optics could 
never have its most important explanatory factor transported from a different scientific 
domain. 
However, this answer will only be correct because the genus of optics and the 
genus of geometry will be the same in some specific way – so that geometry will not 
qualify as a “different scientific domain” in the context of Question 1, even if geometry 
does qualify as a “different scientific domain” in the context of Question 2 (for the 
overall set of propositions, basic procedures, basic minor terms etc., are quite different 
in optics and in geometry). The genus of optics and the genus of geometry turn out be 
the same in a way because the nature of the attributes to be explained in optics is 
basically the same as the nature of the attributes to be explained in geometry – and their 
appropriate explanatory factors are also the same. But, of course, the content of most 
propositions involved in optics will be different from the content of the propositions 
employed in geometry, for in optics the same attributes will be predicated of subjects 
that belong to a different kind, the natural lines, described as limits of natural bodies.15 
But the difference in content of the predicative propositions involved in each science 
does not affect the suggeneia of the major and middle terms: the attributes to be 
explained (the major terms) in optics are the same as (a subset of) those in geometry, as 
well as the explanatory factors (the middle terms) in optics are the same as (a subset of) 
those in geometry. And suggeneia between major and middle terms is what really 
                                                                                                                                          
passage) it would collapse into geometry after all. Aristotle is focusing on the minor terms of 
demonstrations, which make optics and geometry qualify as different disciplines within the scope of 
Question 2. However, in the Metaphysics passage, Aristotle’s focus is on the major terms of 
demonstrations, as well as on the fact that they are demonstrated from the same principles as the major 
terms in geometry (for this language about “minor/ major terms”, see note 10). 
14 I take this to be the gist of 75b8-9: the genus of optics and the genus of geometry are the same in a way 
(πῇ). This answer also explains why Aristotle is most inclined to include optics within the branches of 
mathematical sciences, see Physics 194a7-8 (taking “µαθηµάτων” as partitive), Posterior Analytics 
79a18-20. 
15 See Physics II.2 194a7-12 (cf. 193b31-33 to complete the picture; APo I.13, 79a8-10, I.27, 87a33-34). 
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matters in the discussion of kind-crossing, which thus turns out to be within the scope of 
Question 1, not Question 2.16 
 
3. Examining the passage from Incessu Animalium: 
 
In chapter 9 of Incessu Animalium, Aristotle addresses the question about the 
bending of limbs in animal progression. There are several details which I cannot discuss 
in this paper – for instance, the question is originally framed within the domain of 
animals that make the progression by means of specific parts, namely, the limbs (cf. 
711a20-21), but Aristotle then extends the same solution to the domain of animals that 
make the progression with no limbs at all (since they have no limbs – snakes, leeches, 
worms etc.) – without discussing or even spotting some potencial difficulties of this 
extended solution.17 Besides, it is hard to believe that Aristotle has not spotted any 
difficulty in applying his paradigm explanation to other cases, such as flying and 
swimming (cf. 709b9ff.), specially because one of the points about the necessity of 
bending the limbs is to avoid falling down in the ground (709a16-17). However, I will 
not examine any of these difficulties. I will focus only on the specific passages in which 
Aristotle appeals to some geometrical stuff in order to explain why bending the limbs is 
necessary for the animal which makes the progression. 
The specific thesis for which Aristotle is arguing is this: 
T1 “now, if there were no bending, there would be no progression (or swimming or 
flying)” (708b26-27, my translation).18 
 
The relevant sort of bending was previously defined in general terms in 708b22-
24.19 Aristotle starts his argument in favour of the thesis by saying this: 
 
                                                
16 Suggeneia between the major and the middle terms is at stake not only in 76a8-9, but also in 75a10-11, 
where I take “ta akra” to refer only to the major terms (the plural being distributive: for every 
demonstration, its major term etc.). 
17 For discussion of these issues, see Frey (forth.), Section 4. 
18 As Farquharson’s translation is problematic in the most important junctures (and Forster’s too), I will 
not use it systematically, and will add several modifications to it.   
19 For discussion, see Frey (forth.), Section 2, p. 2-4. 
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T2 “For since limbed creatures stand and take their weight alternately on one or other of 
the opposite legs, if one be thrust forward the other must of necessity be bent.” (708b27-
30, Farquharson’s translation). 
 
The animal makes the progression by means of limbs – or, even more 
particularly, legs (for Aristotle seems to have taken the human being as a paradigm to 
explain the general point20). Besides, having said that the limbs are always even (never 
odd) in number (708a21-22, 708b20), Aristotle adds that the animal must distribute its 
weight alternately in each of its limbs while progressing. But, while the animal does 
this, the limb which stays at rest (and supports the weight) must bend.  Why is this so? 
(Note that Aristotle has not exactly said that only the resting limb should bend while the 
projecting limb must move itself compactly etc. Aristotle is probably aware that both 
limbs do some bending. This is important because it suggests that some simplifications 
are allowed in the description of particular cases in order to focus on the core 
theoretical issue at stake, which is the strict necessity of the bending)21. In order to 
explain why the animal must bend its limbs while progressing, Aristotle states this 
(which is on of my key passages): 
 
T3 “For the corresponding limbs are naturally of equal length, and the one which is 
under the weight must be a kind of perpendicular at right angles to the ground. But 
when a leg advances, there becomes an hypotenuse, equivalent to the size of the resting 
leg plus the line between [the moving leg and the ground]. Since the legs are equal, the 
leg at rest must bend (either at the knee or at some articulation)” (708b30-709a3, my 
translation, adapted from Farquharson’s and Forster’s). 
 
Aristotle’s language is very compact here, but the employment of geometrical 
terminology makes his claim clear. Following Michael of Ephesus (153.24-32, 154.10-
11; 155.28-30), both Farquharson and Forster have translated 709a1-2 as conveying 
                                                
20 See Michael of Ephesus 153.8-10. 
21 For discussion of this issue, see Frey (forth.), Section 2.2. 
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some reference to the Pythagorean theorem, although nothing like that is needed.22 The 
expression “δυναµένη” (709a1) is employed in the ordinary sense of “being equivalent 
to”.23 The relevant issue hinges on the expression “καὶ τὴν µεταξύ”, which I take (with 
Louis, cf. 158, n2) to be referring to the line DC in Figure below, that is, the line 
covering the interval between the point where the moving leg ends (D) and the point 
which that leg must reach (C). This might be reasonably argued from the context: 
Aristotle is talking about progression, which is the change from one position to another. 
When one leg is projected forward and the other stays in rest, they suggest two sides of 
a right-angled triangle, of which the remaining side is the ground. Let A be the point 
from where both legs hang.24 Let B be the point where the resting leg touches the 
ground. Let C be the point which the moving leg is going to reach. Now, it is clear that 
the hypotenuse of this triangle – line AC – is greater than the moving leg of the animal. 
Let D be the point where the moving leg ends, so that line AD is equal in lenght to line 
AB (for both legs are naturally equal in lenght). Since the moving leg must reach point 
C but its lenght only allows it to reach point D, something is needed: there is some help 
coming from the bending of the resting leg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 My point does not imply denying that the Pythagorean theorem is true about the leg’s triangle. My 
point is that the truth of that theorem does not play any explanatory role in the story. For a different view, 
see Frey (forth.), p. 8, 18.  
23 Actually, it is puzzling to see Farquharson and Forster preferring the authority of Michael of Ephesus 
than Liddell & Scott’s authority, who have given 709a19 as an example of the ordinary employment of 
“δύναµαι” in sense II.2: “to be equivalent to” (Liddell&Scott, p. 452). Now, it is true that “δυναµένη” in 
709a1 and “δυνήσεται” 709a19 could have different forces, but this is not the case. Taking “δυναµένη” in 
709a1 as conveying some relevant reference to the Pythagorean theorem has misled many readers.  
24 Or, as Michael of Ephesus has put it (153.17): “the place from where the dry excrement goes out”. 
However, it is hard to believe that, some lines before, Michael of Ephesus has said something so wrong as 
this (153.15-16): “when Socrates is standing still, there comes to be an isosceles triangle”. The 
comparison with an isosceles triangle, which appears in 709a22-23, refers to the moment when Socrates 
is walking and his projecting leg reaches the ground – like the Beatles in Abbey Road. 
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A more sophisticated geometrical story might be fleshed out,25 but the gist of 
Aristotle’s argument is the following: given that (i) the animal must reach point C (since 
progression is moving from B to C), but (ii) the length of the moving limb (AD) is 
smaller than needed to reach point C, (iii) the animal must bend the resting limb (AB) in 
order to make (or help) the projecting limb to reach C. And, of course, the animal must 
bend the resting limb forward, namely, in the direction of point C (711a27-29). By 
bending its resting limb, the animal allows its projecting limb (AD) to become greater 
than the resting limb (AB) while being equal to it – in other words, the animal allows its 
projecting limb (AD) to ‘become equal’ to the hypothenuse (AC) and to reach point C. 
This is what Aristotle explains more carefully in this pleasantful passage: 
 
T4 “For if one leg is at right angles to the ground and the other is advanced, the latter 
will be greater while being equal. For it will be equivalent to the stationary leg and also 
equivalent to the hypotenuse” (709a17-20, adapted from Farquharson’s and Forster’s). 
 
Let me spell this out. When saying that “the latter will be greater”, Aristotle 
means that the advanced leg will be greater than the resting leg – he means that, as the 
advanced leg will reach point C, it will somehow be equal to AC, which is greater than 
AB. When he adds the remark “while being equal”, Aristotle means that, although it 
reaches point C and becomes somehow equivalent to AC, the advanced leg (AD) is still 
equal in length to the resting leg (AB). When Aristotle proceeds and says that the 
advanced leg “will be equivalent to the stationary leg”, he is remarking that both legs 
are still equal in length, i.e., AD is equal in length to AB (and this answers to “while 
being equal” in the previous sentence). But in adding that the advanced leg “will be also 
equivalent to the hypotenuse” (which answers to “will be greater” in the previous 
sentence), Aristotle is stressing that, while remaining the same in length as AB, the 
advanced leg has become equivalent to the hypotenuse AC and has reached point C – 
which means that the animal has made a progressing step.26 And the “trick” – to make 
AD greater than AB while remaining equal to it – has been made by the bending of the 
                                                
25 See Frey (forth.), Section 2.1. 
26 Michael of Ephesus (155.29-30) wrongly says that “ὑποτείνουσαν” in 709a20 changes its referent: it 
designates the basis of the right-angled triangle. But this makes no sense. 
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resting limb.27 (Actually, as Aristotle will make clearer further on, the “trick” is the 
result of the bending of the resting limb together with other factors, such as the animal 
leaning forward as a whole etc., cf. 709a21). 
 
4. The explanatory role of the several factors in the explanation: 
 
What this sort of explanation amounts to? Premise (ii) in the argument sketched 
above can be explained with the aid of the geometry. That the lines referred to by AD 
and AB are equal to each other is something that comes from the zoologist’s 
consideration that corresponding limbs are normally of the same lenght (cf. 708b30-31). 
But that line AD is smaller than AC is something that only depends from the specific 
principles of geometry. 
Thus, we see principles from geometry doing some explanatory work here. This 
fact raises the important exegetical question: did Aristotle in Incessu Animalium depart 
from his Posterior Analytics theory about kind-crossing? Is Aristotle now allowing the 
zoologist to perform a once forbidden kind-crossing by employing geometrical 
premises? But this is Question 2. There is also Question 1: do the geometrical 
propositions involved in Aristotle’s reasoning deliver the most important explanatory 
factor to explain the explanandum at stake, namely, why animals bend their limbs in 
progressing?  
My answer to Question 2 is straightforward: the discussion of kind-crossing in 
the Posterior Analytics has never forbidden the situation found in the Incessu 
Animalium, namely, the employment of premises from a given discipline (geometry) as 
an auxiliary tool for explaining an explanandum in a different discipline (zoology).28  
As it comes to Question 1, I remark that the geometrical propositions involved in 
the Incessu Animalium passage are not playing the most important role in explaining the 
explanandum at stake – why animals bend their limbs in progressing. The proposition 
                                                
27 The commentary of Michael of Ephesus is convoluted, but at 153.32-34 he seems to have grasped the 
essential: “the right leg was equal to the left one before moving: it is clear, therefore, that the left leg has 
bent in the knee”. 
28 Thus, medicine is not exactly treated as a subordinate science (such as optics is taken to be 
subordinated to geometry), but nevertheless can employ a geometrical premise when dealing with the 
explanation of some explananda (cf. 79a13-16). It is no surprise, therefore, to find Aristotle developing 
what Hussey (1991) has called mathematical physics: what he has said in Posterior Analytics has never 
forbidden it. See also Frey (forth.) 
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that line AD is smaller than AC is applied to describe an important feature of reality to 
which even animals and their movements are constrained. However, there is more in the 
explanation. Let us consider it again (with some rephrasements), having the figure in 
mind: 
(i) the animal must reach point C; 
(ii) the length of the projecting limb (AD) is smaller than needed to reach point C 
(for AD is smaller than AC); 
(iii) the length of the projecting limb (AD) must become greater than AD (and 
AB) to reach point C; 
(iv) the animal must bend the resting limb (AB) in order to make (or help) the 
projecting limb to reach C (which is for it to become greater than AB while 
remaining equal to it). 
 
There is geometry – explicit or underlying – only in steps (ii) and (iii). But two 
remarks are in order here. Firstly, step (i) introduces important information about the 
explanandum: its subject is an animal – i.e., a living being with such and such features 
and an articulated structure that is suited to the performance of its activities. Secondly, 
there are still some gaps in the passage from (i)-(ii)-(iii) to the conclusion (iv). Steps (ii) 
and (iii) stems from geometry and capture important conditions of reality that constrain 
(besides other things ) the progression of the animals: the fact that lines AD and AB are 
equal to each other but smaller than AC; the fact that there is a distance between C and 
D. But it does not follow automatically from these geometrical facts that the animal 
must bend its limbs, nor that different animals must bend their limbs in the way they 
actually bend. Further on, Aristotle says that, if there were no bending, “the animal 
would either fall or not advance at all when its position forms an angle smaller than the 
right one” (709a16-17). Now, maybe the falling at stake is equivalent to loosing its erect 
position and collapsing on the floor (for Aristotle seems to have taken the human being 
as his paradigm). However, it is plausible to take the falling as equivalent to “falling (in 
a clumsy way) on its foot”. In that case, animals will clumsily progress as some 
grotesque robots in science fiction movies – each step, a sort of falling down in the 
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ground.29 But why things are not this way? And why different kinds of animals bend 
their limbs in different ways?  
These two questions are related. Progression is not a clumsy falling on its feet 
(from D to C) because nature does nothing in vain – which is one of the ultimate 
principles evoked by Aristotle at the beginning of the Incessu Animalium: 
 
T5: “Nature does nothing in vain, but always the best possible in each kind of living 
being by reference to its essential constitution.” (704b15-18, Farquharason’s translation, 
modified).30  
 
This principle has nothing to do with a presumed Nature governing the world 
providencially etc. The word “nature” (φύσις), in several occurrences in the biological 
treatises, refers to something concrete: it is the structure of the animal as a whole, which 
corresponds to its essence (cf. 712b23, 714a8) – an articulated structure in which 
several parts have grown together and became suited to each other to perform the living 
activities that characterize the animal.31 This force of “phusis” is closely connected with 
the employment of the verb “phuo” and its cognates to describe how a living being 
grows articulatedly – in such a way that different parts become suited to each other. 
This employment of “phusis” is on the root of Aristotle’s teleological principle. The 
proposition that “nature does nothing in vain”, far from appealing to some Mother 
Nature outside natural things, is a generalisation of observed facts: living beings 
develop themselves as articulated structures in which different parts constrain each 
other so that the whole results in a well-functioning system. 
Thus, why do animals bend their limbs in progressing, instead of falling clumsy 
on their feet in each step? The geometrical premises involved in steps (ii)-(iii) above 
play an important part in the fullest appropriate explanation of this fact. But, ultimately, 
the most important explanatory factor to explain why animals bend their limbs does not 
come from geometry: it comes instead from one of the most important principles of 
                                                
29 Remember the first scene in which the robot CASE appears in Nolan’s Interstellar – just CASE, which 
later will prove a perfection in progression. 
30 See also Physics 198b8-9, where teleology is evoked with the same flavour: nature aims at what is the 
best for the animal, within a given range of possibilities; for a careful discussion, see Lennox 2001b, p. 
206-7, 216-8; Judson 2015, p. 183. 
31 For careful discussion about this issue, see Lennox 2001a, especially p. 188-9, 195. 
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natural science, namely, that the nature of each animal is a complex articulated structure 
in which several parts have grown together and became suited to each other to perform 
the living activities in a successfull way. This has nothing to do with geometry (the 
geometer would probably be more happy with the sci-fi robotwise progressing). The 
geometrical propositions involved in steps (ii) and (iii) of the explanatory story are only 
setting the general conditions that constrain any progression (or actually any 
locomotion). But the most important explanatory factor in that explanation stems from 
the nature of the animal or, more precisely, from the fact that the animal is a natural 
living being, which is structured to perform its activities in the way that is the best 
possible within its essential constitution. Falling down on its feet is not as good as 
bending its limbs and progressing smoothly. 
 
5. Conclusion: 
Thus, Incessu Animalium is in agreement with the Posterior Analytics:  
(1) Aristotle still maintains the claim that the fullest appropriate explanation of a given 
explanandum within a particular domain (e.g., the bending of the limbs in animal 
progression) could never have its most important explanatory factor transported from a 
different scientific domain (e.g., geometry). 
(2) But Aristotle has never claimed that a given scientific domain could never employ 
premises which properly belongs to a different scientific domain. What is forbidden is 
to employ such premises as if they were the most important explanatory factor to attain 
the fullest appropriate explanation of a given explanandum. 
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